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CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO PLEA
BARGAINING: A NEW WAIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The right, to a trial by jury, a right guaranteed by the sixth
amendment,' has been seriously undermined by the huge criminal
caseload and the limited resources of our judicial system. Jury trial has
become the exception rather than the rule as guilty pleas dispose of the
vast majority of criminal cases without trial.' Plea bargaining, the sys-
tem whereby criminal defendants are given inducements in the form of
reduced charges or lighter sentences in exchange for pleading guilty,
has been accepted as a necessary evil and upheld by the Supreme Court
as a constitutional method of determining guilt.8 Some commentators,
however, dispute the Supreme Court's view, arguing that plea bargain-
ing infringes a criminal defendant's absolute right to a trial by jury,
and thus is unconstitutional.4 These commentators urge that the system
provide resources adequate to permit the exercise of this constitutional
right.5
Alternatives to increasing resources do, however, exist. Several ma-
jor American cities have tried using criminal bench trials for the same
purpose that most other cities have used guilty pleas: as an inexpensive
alternative to jury trials.' In these jurisdictions, the state promises to
1 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 931, 935 n.36 (1983); Cramer,
Rossman & McDonald, TheJudicial Role in Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING
139 (W. McDonald & J. Cramer eds. 1980); Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles
in the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions
Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2
(1982).
' See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970).
" Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U.
COLo. L. REV. 1, 63-65 (1975); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
1 Note, supra note 4, at 1411; see also Alschuler, supra note 2 (proposing other
alternatives, such as jury waiver systems).
6 For studies of these jurisdictions, see generally J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB,
FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977)
(study of Baltimore); M. LEVIN, URBAN POLrIICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS
(1977) (study of Pittsburgh); Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abo-
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drop charges or deliver reduced sentences in return, not for the criminal
defendant's waiver of his right to trial but rather for the defendant's
waiver of his right to have a jury determine his guilt. Like cities that
rely heavily on securing guilty pleas, cities that dispose of a significant
number of cases by means of bench trials provide powerful incentives
for the criminal defendant to waive the constitutional right to trial by
jury.7 Defendants who waive their right to a jury trial are rewarded;
those who demand a jury trial are punished.'
In studying the jurisdictions that rely on bench trials, commenta-
tors have focused their attention on the question whether the bench
trials defendants receive in exchange for waiving their constitutional
right to a jury are "real" trials.9 The more fundamental question,
whether incentives to waive the right to a jury are constitutional, has
been largely ignored.
In considering the latter question, three lines of Supreme Court
cases are relevant: the cases upholding plea bargaining, the cases con-
sidering unconstitutional conditions, and the cases involving "vindic-
tive" sentencing. Many commentators claim to find irreconcilable con-
flicts among these lines of decisions.10  The well-established
unconstitutional conditions doctrine seems to hold that penalties may
not be imposed on, nor government privileges withheld from, those who
exercise their constitutional rights."' The decisions upholding plea bar-
gaining, however, could be said to fly in the face of that doctrine." In
plea bargaining, defendants are, in effect, penalized for demanding
their right to a trial, or conversely, rewarded for waiving that right. As
lition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAw & Soc'v
REv. 393 (1979) (study of Detroit); Mather, Some Determinants of the Method of Case
Disposition: Decision-Making by Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 187 (1973) (study of Los Angeles); Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?,
97 HARv. L. REv. (forthcoming, No. 5 Mar. 1984) (study of Philadelphia); White, A
Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 441-42
(1971) (study of Philadelphia).
7 For the forms in which these incentives may be offered see infra text accompa-
nying notes 145-47.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
0 Most observers have characterized these bench trials as "slow pleas of guilty."
See infra note 161; see also White, supra note 6, at 441-42. The most recent commen-
tator disputes that characterization. Schulhofer, supra note 6.
"0 See Coffee, "Twisting Slowly in the Wind": A Search for Constitutional Limits
on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 220; Halberstam,
supra note 2, at 1-35; O'Brien, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court: The Limits
of Due Process and Substantive Justice, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 134-50 (1981);
Note, The Supreme Court 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 152-53 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, The Supreme Court 1969 Term]; Note, supra note 4, at 1400 (1970).
a See infra text accompanying notes 25-27.
's See infra text accompanying notes 64-97.
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one critic has said, "the Court [in upholding plea bargaining] has en-
gaged in constitutional interpretation that is analytically untena-
ble. . . . It has, in sum, sought to justify a result, rather than to apply
neutral principles to the determination of the issue before it."'"
Most commentators find a similar conflict between the decisions
upholding plea bargaining and the decisions invalidating vindictive sen-
tencing.14 The vindictive sentencing cases, which raise issues remarka-
bly similar to those in the plea bargaining cases, began with North
Carolina v. Pearce.'5 In Pearce, the Court held that a judge could not
impose a harsher sentence after a remand and retrial than he had im-
posed after the original trial.'6 The Court declared that such a sentence
puts "a price on an appeal.' 7 Although Pearce appears consistent with
the unconstitutional conditions cases, it is hard to reconcile with the
plea bargaining cases.
This Comment examines these three apparently inconsistent lines
of cases and establishes a framework for analyzing the constitutional
dimensions of the right to a trial by jury. After examining the relevant
case law in Part II, the Comment concludes that the right to a trial by
jury is not an absolute right but rather one which can be impinged
upon by valid state interests.' 8 To determine the constitutionality of
state infringement upon the right to trial by jury a three-part test
should be applied: is a constitutional right infringed?, is the infringe-
ment justified by a compelling state interest?, and is the method of pro-
moting the compelling state interest the least restrictive alternative in
terms of its impact on constitutional rights? Such an analysis produces
results consistent with the results reached in the three lines of cases.
The Comment applies this tripartite test to the state's provision of in-
centives to waive the right to jury and finds that such incentives can be
constitutional provided that they are implemented by the least restric-
tive means. Part III explores the implications of that conclusion, argu-
ing that a jury waiver system is not only less restrictive of sixth amend-
ment rights than the plea bargaining system in that the jury waiver
system preserves some trial rights, but also that a jury waiver system
is Halberstam, supra note 2, at 4.
14 See Coffee, supra note 10, at 220; Halberstam, supra note 2, at 6-18; Nemer-
son, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 715-19 (1980); Schulhofer, Due Pro-
cess of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 780 (1980); Note, The Supreme Court
1969 Term, supra note 10, at 153-54.
15 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
16 Id. at 724.
17 Id.
'8 The question of precisely how substantial the state interest must be is outside
the scope of this Comment.
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accomplishes the state's purpose by substantially attaining the efficiency
goals currently achieved through plea bargaining. Because a jury
waiver system is both less restrictive than and an alternative to plea
bargaining, the Comment concludes that plea bargaining should be de-
clared unconstitutional.
II. RETHINKING A DOCTRINAL TRILEMMA
In order to determine the constitutionality of incentives to waive
the right to jury, one must first look for a principled basis upon which
to harmonize the three seemingly conflicting lines of cases. Plea bar-
gaining cases consider the constitutionality of providing criminal defen-
dants with incentives to plead guilty. The guilty plea represents the
defendant's decision not to contest the state's case against him and re-
sults in the loss of the many constitutionally guaranteed rights associ-
ated with the right to a jury trial.19 Despite its negative impact upon a
criminal defendant's constitutional rights, plea bargaining has been
held constitutional. 0
In contrast, the Supreme Court has found the imposition of certain
penalties on the right to appeal unconstitutional21 and has handed
down a number of opinions limiting the state's ability to place condi-
tions upon the exercise of constitutional rights. These cases appear to
be completely inconsistent with the Court's acceptance of plea bargain-
ing. Commentators have been nearly unanimous in their criticism of
the Court's plea bargaining decisions.12 None has been able to reconcile
the decisions with other doctrine, and most would probably agree with
Professor Halberstam that the Court has merely "sought to justify a
result."
Indeed, the tone of the Court's decisions in the three areas is im-
possible to harmonize. Moreover, the welter of justifications the Court
has offered for upholding plea bargaining suggests that the Court itself
can find no principled basis for its holdings. The argument to be prof-
fered here, however, is that the cases can be reconciled upon a princi-
pled ground, which has not heretofore been considered by the commen-
tators but is consistent with other areas of Supreme Court adjudication.
The framework within which the Court's decisions may be recon-
ciled is a "least restrictive alternative" analysis. This analysis, which is
19 See infra text accompanying notes 152-59.
, See infra text accompanying notes 69-79.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 122-39.
2 See supra note 10. Some members of the Court have joined in that criticism.
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 367 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
s Halberstam, supra note 2, at 4.
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said to have arisen in the context of antitrust law, 4 has three levels. At
the first level, the question is whether a constitutional right has been
impaired. If not, the law or governmental action is constitutional and
the inquiry goes no further. If, however, a constitutional right has been
impaired the question becomes whether a substantial, legitimate gov-
ernmental interest is furthered by the law or action. If there is no such
governmental interest, the law or action is unconstitutional. Even when
a substantial, legitimate governmental interest can be demonstrated, the
law is unconstitutional if there is another reasonable and adequate, but
less restrictive, means to the government's objective. If no reasonable
alternative exists, the law or action is constitutional, despite the inci-
dental burden on constitutional rights. In sum, the government may
justify an impingement upon constitutional rights only by demonstrat-
ing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving a substantial, legiti-
mate state goal. The appeal of this analysis lies in its ability to effect a
reasonable accommodation between conflicting interests.
Careful consideration of the three lines of cases supports the con-
tention that the least restrictive alternative test successfully reconciles
the case law that is relevant to evaluating state action that infringes the
right to a jury trial. The next sections will examine each of these lines
of cases.
A. Unconstitutional Conditions
An unconstitutional condition exists when the government "struc-
ture[s] an individual's choice in such a way that he will voluntarily
forgo" one or more constitutional rights "in order to retain a different
state-granted benefit."'2 5 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
"holds that government may not condition the receipt of its benefits
upon the nonassertion of constitutional rights even if receipt of such
benefits is in all other respects a 'mere privilege.' "26 Simply put, the
doctrine means "that whatever an express constitutional provision for-
bids government to do directly it equally forbids government to do
indirectly."1
2 7
The Supreme Court established the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission.2 s In
"' See Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Pro-
cess, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463, 1463 n.1 (1967).
21 Note, supra note 4, at 1399.
28 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 510 (1978).
17 Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1445-46 (1968).
28 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
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that case, the Court held that due process was violated when the use of
highways was conditioned upon conversion of private carriers to com-
mon carriers. The Court explained that its holding was necessary to
protect constitutional rights and further noted that a direct impinge-
ment upon constitutional rights would be clearly unconstitutional. 9 But
what if the state, as in the present case, merely withheld "a privilege
which may be vital" until the individual relinquished his constitutional
rights?"0 The Court said that if that were allowed, "constitutional
guaranties, so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, [would be]
open to destruction by the indirect but no less effective process of re-
quiring a surrender, which, though in form voluntary, in fact lacks
none of the elements of compulsion.""1 The Court concluded that an
individual in such a position "is given no choice, except a choice be-
tween the rock and the whirlpool.""2
Early decisions followed the reasoning of Frost & Frost."3 In
Speiser v. Randall the Court held unconstitutional the denial of tax
exemptions to veterans who refused to subscribe oaths." Echoing the
theme of the Frost & Frost decision, the Court said: "To deny an ex-
emption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect
to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if
the State were to fine them for this speech." 5
In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court held that the state could not take
away the jobs of teachers who refused to list every organization to
which they had belonged in the past five years.36 Similarly, in Sherbert
v. Verner, the Court invalidated the withholding of unemployment ben-
efits from those who refused, for religious reasons, to work on
Saturdays.
37
Four years later, in Garrity v. New Jersey " and Spevack v.
Klein, 9 the Supreme Court issued its broadest condemnation of impos-
ing conditions upon constitutional rights. In Garrity, the Court held
that police officers under investigation could not be threatened with the
219 Id. at 593.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (unconstitutional to con-
dition public employment upon taking of oath denying affiliation with certain groups);
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (unconstitutional to condition mailing
privilege upon compliance with content standards).
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
35 Id. at 518.
36 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
37 374 U.S. 398,410 (1963).
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
39 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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loss of their jobs for refusing to testify during an investigation of their
actions. 40 The Court said that coercion was "inherent in this scheme of
questioning," and that therefore the statements made could not "be sus-
tained as voluntary."' 1 Recalling Frost & Frost, the Court said that
"[w]here the choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is
inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other."' 2
Spevack, announced the same day as Garrity, echoed the tone and
holding of Garrity. Writing for the plurality, Justice Douglas held that
an attorney could not be disbarred for refusing to produce financial
records and testify at a judicial inquiry.4" The Court said that a person
has a right to remain silent and "'to suffer no penalty .. .for such
silence.' -44 The Court defined a penalty as any sanction which makes
assertion of the constitutional right costly.
45
Three years after Garrity and Spevack, however, the Court upheld
a notice-of-alibi rule which allegedly conditioned the defendant's right
to present a defense.4" In Williams v. Florida, a defendant was re-
quired to give the government notice that he planned to present an alibi
defense.47 The Court upheld the notice requirement by finding that the
dilemma faced by the defendant was essentially the same one he faced
at trial: whether to call an alibi witness or not. The Court said this
dilemma did not coerce him, within the meaning of the fourth and fifth
amendments. 4" Thus, even though the Court upheld the validity of the
"condition," this case is consistent with the reasoning of other unconsti-
tutional conditions cases as the Court did not find that the condition
burdened the constitutional right.
In sum, the Court's unconstitutional conditions cases stand for the
principle that withholding government benefits-whether use of the
highways, money, jobs, or the right to practice law-in such a manner
that an individual feels compelled to waive his constitutional rights is as
unconstitutional as directly revoking those constitutional rights.
Some cases and commentators view the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as absolutely forbidding any government action that places
conditions or qualifications upon the exercise of constitutional rights.
For example, in Frost & Frost, the Court equated indirect with direct
40 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 498.
43 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 514.
44 Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
45 Id. at 515.
46 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
41 Id. at 80-86.
43 Id. at 82-84.
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impingements upon constitutional rights and declared conditions upon
constitutional rights invalid.49 Similarly, Professor Van Alstyne has ex-
amined the unconstitutional conditions cases and concluded that the
Court has simply "appl[ied] the literal mandate of a given constitu-
tional provision flatly to forbid government from conditioning its largess
on any waiver of such a provision regardless of the circumstances."50
Despite these sweeping statements, this Comment takes the posi-
tion that the Court's decisions in the unconstitutional conditions area
are consistent with a least restrictive alternative analysis. One commen-
tator has argued for this conclusion, noting that decisions on the consti-
tutionality of conditions have turned upon whether the condition "effec-
tuate[d] a legitimate state interest" and whether the state-imposed
condition was "narrowly drawn.""1 Both of these elements are key to a
least restrictive alternative analysis.
The Court explicitly used the least restrictive alternative analysis
in Shelton v. Tucker,52 holding that the state could not fire teachers for
refusing to list every organization to which they had belonged in the
past five years.58 The Court noted that the state did have a legitimate
interest in determining the competence of its teachers" but found that
there were "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
55
Thus, the availability of a less restrictive alternative meant that the
condition imposed failed at the third level and was therefore invalid.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court invalidated a state law that with-
held unemployment benefits from those who refused for religious rea-
sons to work on Saturdays.51 In doing so the Court distinguished Sher-
bert from a similar earlier case by holding that the regulation in
Sherbert did not further a substantial, legitimate state interest.57 The
condition in Sherbert, therefore, failed the tripartite test at the second
level because of an insufficient state interest.
The categorical statements of Justice Douglas in Garrity v. New
Jersey58 and Spevack v. Klein59 could be viewed as sweeping away all
49 271 U.S. at 593.
50 Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 1447 (emphasis added).
51 Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. Rv.
144, 156-57 (1968).
52 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
53 Id. at 480-82, 490.
54 Id. at 485.
55 Id. at 488.
" 374 U.S. at 399-401, 408-10.
57 Id. at 408-09 (distinguishing Sherbert from Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961)).
" 385 U.S. at 494-500.
59 385 U.S. at 512-19.
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consideration of state interest and treating the individual's constitu-
tional rights as an absolute to be safeguarded against any and all state
infringement. The results in these cases are, however, consistent with a
least restrictive alternative analysis. Both cases implicitly acknowledge
the state's interest in obtaining evidence. "Our question is whether a
State, contrary to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, can
use the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an
employee." 60 Furthermore, the Court said that the practice in Garrity
was similar to that which had been struck by the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona one term earlier. In Miranda, the Court had indicated that the
safeguards which it proposed for the protection of the rights of the ac-
cused would not interfere unduly with the state interest in enforcing
law and obtaining confessions.61 Similarly, recognition of a state inter-
est is implicit in both Garrity and Spevack. Because the state's interest
was not compelling enough to allow the interference with the accused's
constitutional right, one need not decide whether a less restrictive alter-
native (the third step) was available.
When it upheld a condition on a defendant's right to present an
alibi defense in Williams v. Florida, the Court stated that the defend-
ant had not been coerced and therefore no constitutional right was im-
paired. 2 Hence, this case too is explicable under the least restrictive
alternative analysis; it is resolvable at level one.
Thus, the results in the Supreme Court's unconstitutional condi-
tions cases fit with a least restrictive alternative analysis. The results
indicate that a condition impinging upon constitutional rights will be
upheld only if the state has a compelling interest in conditioning the
constitutional right, and no less restrictive alternative is available to ful-
fill the state's need."3
so Garrity, 385 U.S. at 499 (emphasis added). Spevack, which was decided on the
same day as Garrity, was based on the same rationale: lawyers, like policemen, could
not be compelled to incriminate themselves in criminal contexts. Spevack, 385 U.S. at
516. In Spevack, as in Garrity, the state had an interest in obtaining evidence. 385 U.S.
at 516 (citing United States v. White). See also Garrity, 385 U.S. at 507 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("The central issues [in Garrity] are .. . identical to those presented in
Spevack v. Klein ... ."). In both cases, the state's interest was in obtaining evidence
and prosecuting criminals, not in hiring good state employees. Accord Spevack, 385
U.S. at 519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
61 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
62 399 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1970).
,S Least restrictive alternative analysis is widely used in unconstitutional condi-
tions cases. See, e.g., Brand v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1980) (first and four-
teenth amendments protect persons from being discharged from state jobs because of
political party; no state interest sufficiently important to permit conditioning public
employment upon party affiliation); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978)
(striking down statute conditioning marriage on proof that a parent has met child sup-
port obligations; no sufficiently important state interest, closely tailored); Memorial
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B. Plea Bargaining Decisions
Given the unconstitutional conditions cases, one might well have
expected the Court to find plea bargaining unconstitutional. In the last
analysis, plea bargaining is no more than the offering of incentives to
waive trial rights guaranteed by the Constitution." The Court ap-
peared to accept this evaluation when it invalidated a statutory form of
plea bargaining in United States v. Jackson.6 5 The Court held that a
statute providing that the death penalty could be imposed only after a
jury trial put "an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitu-
tional right.""6 Justice Stewart's opinion stated that provisions the
"purpose or effect" of which is to "chill the assertion of constitutional
rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them" are "patently
unconstitutional. '67 The Court found that "the evil in the federal stat-
ute was not that it necessarily coerce[d] guilty pleas and jury waivers
but simply that it needlessly encourage[d] them." 8
Despite the holding and tone of the Jackson decision, the Supreme
Court has proceeded in the fourteen years since that decision to uphold
and justify the practice of plea bargaining. In Brady v. United States,"9
the Court even upheld a guilty plea where, as in Jackson, demanding a
jury trial could have resulted in a death sentence for the defendant. The
Court explained that not every plea made for fear of the death penalty
was invalid.70 Restating the holding of Jackson, the Court said Jackson
merely required that guilty pleas be voluntary and intelligent." The
Court refused to invalidate the practice of plea bargaining, asserting
that the practice benefited both sides7" and that a guilty plea suggested
some "hope for success in rehabilitation.
'73
Not long afterwards, the Court discarded the rehabilitation ration-
ale in North Carolina v. Alford.74 In Alford, the Court upheld a plea
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (struck down durational requirement
as a condition for receipt of medical care by indigents; no compelling state interest, at
262-67; less drastic means available, at 267); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529 (no compelling
state interest).
" "Plea bargaining" as used in this Comment includes any incentive, implicit or
explicit, to waive the right to a trial and enter a plea of guilty.
65 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
6 Id. at 572.
11 Id. at 581.
" Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted).
69 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
70 Id. at 747.
71 Id.
7 Id. at 752-53.
78 Id. at 753.
74 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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of guilty entered to avoid a possible death sentence even though the
defendant adamantly asserted his innocence both before and after the
plea. 5
The Court proffered another rationale for the constitutionality of
plea bargaining in Santobello v. New York."6 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, accorded great weight to the state's interest in
the rapid and efficient disposition of cases effected by plea bargaining:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea
bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration
of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If
every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number of judges and court facilities.
17
The Chief Justice added that plea bargaining "is not only an essential
part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. "78
Each of the reasons cited as making the practice desirable, however,
related at least partly to the reason the Court claimed it was essential:
it costs less and is faster than full-scale jury trials.
79
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes the Court seemed to justify plea bar-
gaining with one of the arguments used in Brady: a negotiated settle-
ment was advantageous to both sides. 80 In Bordenkircher, the Court
rejected the claim that a prosecutor's adding charges against a defend-
ant after the defendant refused to plead guilty violated due process.8"
Justice Stewart wrote for the Court that in "'the give-and-take negoti-
ation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and de-
fense,'" the two sides "'arguably possess relatively equal bargaining
power.' ",82 Thus, there was no danger "that the State might be retali-
ating against the accused" for exercising his constitutional right to a
trial.83 So long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's
offer, the Court reasoned, "there is no such element of punishment or
retaliation." 8' The Court presumed accuracy in plea bargaining, claim-
ing that defendants were "unlikely to be driven to false self-condemna-
75 Id. at 27-29 & n.2.
76 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
7 Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 261.
79 See id.
'0 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1978).
51 Id. at 358-62.
8, Id. at 362 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)).
83 Id. at 363.
" Id.
19841
338 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tion," given the procedural safeguards surrounding the plea. 5 The
Court did, however, caution zealous prosecutors that "there are un-
doubtedly constitutional limits" upon the exercise of the prosecutor's
discretion in plea bargaining.8 6
Undermining the "negotiation" foundation for the constitutionality
of plea bargaining, the Court upheld a statutory plea bargaining
scheme in Corbitt v. New Jersey.8 7 In Corbitt, the Court validated a
statute mandating a life sentence for those convicted of first-degree
murder by a jury, but allowing the possibility of leniency for those who
pleaded non vult to the same charge."' The Court could "discern no
element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to
trial."8  Although there was no bargaining in this case, the Court said
that "as long as [the] cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undis-
turbed" it could not declare this analogous situation unconstitutional."0
The majority could not justify forbidding the legislature from doing
that which the prosecutor had been allowed to do in earlier plea bar-
gaining decisions.9
The Court's most recent affirmation of the practice of plea bar-
gaining again endeavored to establish a principled basic for upholding
the practice as constitutional. In United States v. Goodwin, the defend-
ant had been indicted on additional charges after plea negotiations had
broken down, and he had requested a jury trial.92 Despite the existence
of unilateral government action similar to that in the vindictive sentenc-
ing cases, the Court upheld the addition of charges.
The Court stated that all of its cases had recognized one "ba-
sic-and itself uncontroversial-principle." '  That principle was that
"[tlo punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows
him to do is a due process violation "of the most basic sort.' "" The
critical issue was whether a "reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness"
was present in the state-action.95 In Bordenkircher, the Court recalled,
it had held that "there was no. . .element of punishment in the 'give-
85 Id.
8 Id. at 365.
87 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
88 Id. at 214-17.
89 Id. at 223.
9 Id. at 223-24.
91 Id. at 224 n.14. Justice Stewart's concurrence in t~e judgment, id. at 227, and
Justice Stevens' dissent, id. at 231, saw a difference betwec the more common forms of
plea bargaining and statutory incentives to plead guilty.
92 457 U.S. 368, 370 (1982).
98 Id. at 372.
94 Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
5 Id. at 373.
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and-take' of plea negotiation."9 Similarly, the Court said that in this
case the increased charges "in the context of plea negotiation" did not
evidence "improper prosecutorial 'vindictiveness.' . . . [J]ust as a pros-
ecutor may forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save
the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor may file additional charges
if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser
charges proves unfounded. 97 Thus, while affirming that an individual
could not be penalized for exercising a constitutional right, the Court
adamantly upheld the practice of plea bargaining.
The least restrictive alternative framework is consistent with the
results in the cases upholding plea bargaining. Indeed, that the tripar-
tite analysis would determine the constitutionality of plea bargaining
was predicted by one commentator before any of those cases had been
adjudicated. 8
One might have thought otherwise after some of the early plea
bargaining cases. In Brady v. United States, the Court claimed that one
reason for allowing rewards for guilty pleas was that such pleas indi-
cated a disposition amenable to rehabilitation.9" But the result in North
Carolina v. Alford,100 upholding the guilty plea despite the defendant's
claims of innocence, demonstrated that the constitutionality of plea bar-
gaining did not turn on that factor. Alternatively, the language of some
opinions might give one the impression that the cases turned on the
existence of the "give-and-take" of negotiations inherent in plea bar-
gaining.101 The actual insignificance of this factor, however, was re-
vealed by the Court's decision in Corbitt v. New Jersey upholding a
statutory form of plea bargaining." 2
The remaining, albeit largely unspoken, justification for the hold-
ings in the plea bargaining cases is that plea bargaining is the least
restrictive means by which the government can achieve its substantial
and legitimate interest in the cost-efficient disposition of criminal cases.
Although the Court has not explicitly applied the least restrictive alter-
96 Id. at 378.
7 Id. at 379-80.
98 Comment, supra note 51, at 181.
" 397 U.S. at 753.
100 400 U.S. 25 (1970). At issue in Alford was whether a guilty plea, which was
voluntarily made, could be constitutionally accepted where the defendant nonetheless
asserted his innocence. The Court held such pleas constitutional under certain circum-
stances: "In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and
Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence,
we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it." Id. at
38 (footnote omitted).
101 See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
102 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
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native analysis in this area, its decisions have answered each of the
three questions that form the least restrictive alternative framework,
and the answers the Court has provided have produced results that are
coherent within the least restrictive alternative framework.
On the first level of the three part test, the Court seems to have
recognized that defendants' constitutional rights are impaired by the
plea bargaining process. In United States v. Jackson, the Court prohib-
ited the needless chilling of the exercise of constitutional rights,10 3 im-
plicitly suggesting that the exercise of constitutional rights could be im-
paired for a proper purpose. Likewise, in Corbitt, the Court said that
"not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right. . . is inva-
lid, ' " implicitly indicating that the plea in that case was valid despite
the impingement upon constitutional rights. Not everything the Court
has said supports the view that plea bargaining is an impingement
upon constitutional rights. In Brady and Bordenkircher, the Court
claimed that a plea bargaining system was advantageous to defen-
dants."" The Court has also asserted that defendants are "presump-
tively capable of intelligent choice" and are "unlikely to be driven to
false self-condemnation." '
The view that plea bargaining benefits defendants is unrealistic
and has been less evident in recent plea bargaining cases.10 The reason
the Court described plea bargaining as "advantageous" to defendants
was that it allowed them to avoid the maximum punishment that they
might receive if they exercised their right to trial. 08 In some sense, the
defendant does receive something for waiving his constitutional rights.
As one commentator has pointed out, however, "a sentence differential
is the essence of plea bargaining."10 9 Whether labeled "as a penalty or
as a leniency, the result is the same: those who insist on a trial suffer
substantially longer imprisonment than those who plead guilty." 110 In
the most recent cases, Corbitt and Goodwin, the Court has accepted this
reality and implicitly recognized that plea bargaining does trench on
constitutional rights, leaving only the question whether the burden is a
proper one. 11
108 390 U.S. at 582-83.
104 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218 (footnote omitted).
10' See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978) (quoting Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)); Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
10" Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
107 See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378.
108 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
109 Halberstam, supra note 2, at 15.
110 Id.
"' The question the Court asked in both cases was whether "vindictiveness" was
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The Court has answered the second question of the least restrictive
alternative analysis, whether a substantial and legitimate state interest
is furthered by the impingement, with resounding affirmation."1 2 In
Santobello, the Court clearly stated this conclusion for the first time.113
That opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, echoed remarks he had
made earlier in a speech to the American Bar Association. Chief Jus-
tice Burger had emphasized the necessity of a high guilty plea rate and
stated:
It is elementary, historically and statistically, that systems of
courts-the number of judges, prosecutors and court-
rooms-have been based on the premise that approximately
90 per cent of all defendants will plead guilty, leaving only
10 per cent, more or less, to be tried. . . .The consequence
of what might seem on its face a small percentage change in
the rate of guilty pleas can be tremendous. A reduction from
90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assign-
ment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities-judges,
court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A re-
duction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.
1 14
After accepting in Santobello the premise that plea bargaining was
essential to further the government's interest in cost-efficient disposition
of criminal cases, the Court never questioned the accuracy 9f that be-
lief. Thus, in Bordenkircher the Court concluded that "by tolerating
and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily ac-
cepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecu-
tor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to
forgo his right to plead not guilty."11 5 In Corbitt, the Court reiterated
the motive for the penalty. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372-80; Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 223-
24.
11 The one exception is Jackson. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. There
the Court invalidated a statutory form of plea bargaining. The Court did not consider
the relevance of a government interest in Jackson, which was the first of the plea bar-
gaining cases. The holdings of subsequent cases indicate that Jackson has been over-
ruled sub silentio. At least one commentator has recognized the possibility that Jackson
may no longer be good law, stating that the Court's concern for "the practical, adminis-
trative needs of the system calls into question the continuing validity of Jackson. If
avoidance of administrative overload is a legitimate state interest, then the Government
misargued Jackson." Note, The Supreme Court 1969 Term, supra note 10, at 154
(footnote omitted). The Court's increasing willingness to consider the government's in-
terest in restricting expenditures when deciding constitutional issues has been noted. See
Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978).
115 See supra text accompanying note 77.
114 Burger, The State of the Judiciay-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970) (text
of speech given to the American Bar Association, August 1970).
115 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
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its recognition of the state's interest in "efficient criminal procedure" '16
and concluded that harsher penalties for those who exercise their right
to a trial were constitutional "as long as our cases sustaining plea bar-
gaining remain undisturbed."11 " Finally, elucidating the elements that
distinguished plea bargaining from the vindictiveness cases, the decision
in Goodwin allowed the imposition of a harsher sentence on one who
exercised his rights because the decision to impose the penalty was
grounded in a "societal interest in prosecution." 1 "
On the third level of the least restrictive alternative test, the Court
has not actively looked for alternatives to plea bargaining. In
Santobello, the Court seemed to compare plea bargaining only with
full-scale jury trials in considering efficiency. 19 Deciding that the re-
placement of guilty pleas with "full-scale trials" would force the gov-
ernment "to multiply" present criminal justice system resources "by
many times," the Court concluded that plea bargaining was "an essen-
tial component of the administration of justice. 1 2 ° The use of the term
"essential" suggests that the Court either saw no other alternatives or
that it concluded without comment that any other alternative would not
secure for governments the same magnitude of savings that plea bar-
gaining had.
After Santobello, the Court did not look back. Since then it has
reconsidered neither whether plea bargaining furthered a legitimate
state interest nor whether alternatives are available.1 21 Thus, the
Court's implicit answer to the third question of the least restrictive al-
ternative test is that there are no viable alternatives to plea bargaining.
116 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 220 n.9.
1 ld. at 223-24. The Corbitt Court also stated that "[wihatever might be the
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant
plea bargain are important parts of this country's criminal justice system." Id. at 222
n.12 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (emphasis added)).
118 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.1l (emphasis added).
" See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
120 Id.
121 A recent case in a related area suggests that the Court still views the existence
of alternatives as relevant to the issue of constitutionality. In Ludwig v. Massachusetts,
427 U.S. 618, 626 (1976), the Court held that a two-tier court system, in which no jury
was available at the first level, put no burden on the exercise of the right to a jury. Id.
at 621, 626. The majority did not consider the issue of alternatives because it believed
that the procedure which allowed waiving the lower-tier trial and advancing to the
second tier, by admitting certain findings of fact, did not deny a constitutional right.
The dissent's dispute with the majority did not concern the validity of the incentive but
rather the existence of a less restrictive alternative: allowing defendants to waive the
first-tier trial completely.
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C. Pearce, Blackledge, and "Vindictiveness"
At about the same time that the Court was upholding plea bar-
gaining, it was invalidating the imposition of penalties upon the exer-
cise of the right to appeal on the grounds that such penalties were im-
properly "vindictive." In North Carolina v. Pearce, a defendant who
successfully appealed a conviction and thereby won the right to a new
trial received a harsher sentence from the same judge after being con-
victed a second time.1 22 Ruling that "vindictiveness against a defend-
ant" violates due process, the Court invalidated the higher sentence. 123
The Court stated that "the imposition of such a punishment, 'penaliz-
ing those who choose to exercise' constitutional rights, 'would be pa-
tently unconstitutional.' "124 Accordingly, the Court fashioned a broad
prophylactic rule that a judge must state reasons for imposing a more
severe sentence after retrial. 25
In Blackledge v. Perry, the Court applied the Pearce rule to
charges added by a prosecutor after a defendant exercised his right to a
trial de novo. 26 The Court reached that result despite its recognition
that the prosecutor's interest in adding charges bore certain similarities
to a prosecutor's interest in a plea bargaining situation. 27
The Court soon distinguished from Pearce situations in which a
second, harsher sentence was imposed by some authority other than the
sentencing authority the defendant had faced in his first trial. Thus, in
Colten v. Kentucky, the Court found no "possibility of vindictiveness"
in a harsher sentence following a second trial in a two-tier court sys-
tem.128 "The trial de novo represents a completely fresh determination
of guilt or innocence. It is not an appeal on the record. '129 Likewise, in
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the Court found no "hazard of vindictiveness"
when a more severe sentence was imposed by a jury on retrial than had
been imposed by the original jury. 3 '
These cases appear to be consistent with the unconstitutional con-
ditions cases but in direct conflict with the cases justifying plea bargain-
ing. After all, one could argue that providing disincentives to exercising
the right to appeal contributes to the same efficiency goals sought to be
122 395 U.S. 711, 713 (1969).
123 Id. at 725.
124 Id. at 724 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
125 Id. at 726.
126 417 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1974).
127 Id. at 27-28.
128 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
129 Id. at 117.
130 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
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achieved through plea bargaining.
Some distinctions become clear, however, when the vindictiveness
cases are examined in terms of the least restrictive alternative analysis.
These cases can be viewed as constitutionally suspect at the second level
of the analysis, given the Court's concern that vindictive sentencing may
represent the expression of personal spite on the part of judge or prose-
cutor, rather than the implementation of a legitimate state interest in
efficient disposition of cases. This concern can be seen in Pearce, in
which the Court states that access to appellate review should be "'kept
free of unreasoned distinctions' "131 and expresses some concern about
the difficulty of proving in any particular case that the result was moti-
vated by personal spite.' In the Court's view, there is an unacceptable
danger that the penalty in such cases will be increased as a result of a
personal grudge held by the prosecutor or judge for having been found
in error and having to handle the same case twice. Thus, vindictive
sentencing is seen as serving a personal rather than legitimate state
interest.
The results of Chaffin v. Stynchcombe 3 and Colten v. Ken-
tucky,1'4 in which the Court allowed increased sentences or charges in
circumstances that were identical except that the penalty was imposed
by an authority other than the one that had imposed the original sen-
tence or charges, lend support to this interpretation.
The Court's language also supports the hypothesized distinction.
In Pearce, the Court said the critical element was the likelihood of a
"retaliatory motivation."'"" In Chaffin, upholding an increased sen-
tence imposed by a different jury than had been reversed,' the Court
explained that "the jury, unlike the judge who has been reversed will
have no personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to
engage in self-vindication.' 3 7 In a more recent statement on the mean-
ing of "vindictiveness," the Court said in Goodwin that the issue was
whether the Court could "'presume' an improper vindictive motive."'""
Although it denied the defendant's claim in Goodwin, the Court added
that an enhanced sentence or charge would be unconstitutional if a de-
fendant could prove in the specific case that the decision "was moti-
131 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11
(1966)).
132 Id. at 725 n.20.
133 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
2- 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
1835 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
131 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 25.
137 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
1" Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added).
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vated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law
plainly allowed him to do." '
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A JURY WAIVER SYSTEM
A least restrictive alternative analysis can be used to determine the
constitutionality of state actions which impinge upon a criminal defend-
ant's right to trial by jury. In the ordinary plea bargaining situation,
the defendant is offered incentives which may lead him not to contest
guilt and to waive all the trial rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In
contrast, a jury waiver system protects certain trial rights although it
does mean the relinquishment of the right to a jury determination of
guilt. While plea bargaining has been declared constitutional, the con-
stitutionality of a jury waiver system is still in doubt.
The Supreme Court has considered only two cases in which incen-
tives were offered specifically to waive a jury, rather than to induce a
guilty plea. In United States v. Jackson,4 0 the Court invalidated a stat-
utory provision which permitted the death penalty to be imposed only
by a jury; waiver of the right to jury effectively foreclosed the death
penalty. This could be seen as the Court's rejection of jury waiver ex-
cept for the fact that Jackson was decided before the Court recognized
as legitimate the state interest furthered by plea bargaining and similar
practices. The state interest issue was not even raised in Jackson.
In another case the Court was confronted with the claim that in-
centives to waive the right to jury were offered. Ludwig v. Massachu-
setts upheld a two-tier court system in which there was no right to a
jury in the lower tier."'
Ludwig argued that the system conditioned his right to jury in
three ways: by forcing him to spend the money necessary for two trials,
by subjecting him to the possibility of a more severe sentence after the
second trial than he would receive after the first, and by imposing the
"increased psychological and physical hardship of two trials." 42 The
Court rejected all three arguments, primarily on the ground that Lud-
wig could have avoided any burden by employing the procedure of "ad-
mitting findings of fact," which allowed defendants to advance directly
113 Id. at 384 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Lower courts have followed the
Supreme Court's direction and looked for improper motivation. See, e.g., United States
v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) ("It is only when
prosecutorial actions stem from an animus toward the exercise of a defendant's rights
that vindictive prosecution exists.").
140 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
141 427 U.S. 618, 626-28 (1976).
142 Id. at 626.
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to the second tier.143 Thus, the challenge to the two-tier court system
failed because the Court concluded that no constitutional right had been
burdened. The dissent's dispute with the majority seems to focus on the
argument that the state had a less restrictive alternative: it could allow
defendants to waive the first-tier trial completely.1 44 So in Ludwig, both
the majority and dissenting opinions are consistent with the least re-
strictive alternative framework.
The constitutionality of jury waiver was not settled by Ludwig. In
Ludwig, the Court found no impingement upon a constitutional right
because of the availability of what it believed was a painless procedural
maneuver by which one could avoid the penalty for demanding the
right to jury. In a jury waiver system comparable to the plea bargain-
ing model, the Court would have to recognize an impingement upon
constitutional rights. Such a system could operate in any of the forms in
which plea bargaining presently exists. Defendants could, for example,
simply waive the right on their own initiativel based on a perception
that defendants usually receive a more lenient) sentence after a bench
trial conviction than after a jury trial convictidn. (This perception has
been instrumental in helping jurisdictions that rely on bench trials to
attain their efficiency goals.)1 4 5 Alternatively, prosecutors could agree to
drop charges in exchange for a jury waiver, or the judge could make an
explicit sentencing concession, contingent on a finding of guilt.1 40 Fi-
nally, the Corbitt decision suggests that legislatures could provide a sen-
tencing "discount" within mandatory sentencing schemes or sentencing
guidelines for those who waived the right to jury.1 47 In each of those
situations, there is an impingement upon a constitutional right. It is the
same impingement which operates in the plea bargaining context: those
who exercise their constitutional rights are penalized with additional
charges or a more severe sentence than those who plead guilty.
Since jury waiver does trench on constitutional rights, the issue, on
the second level of the least restrictive alternative analysis, is whether
jury waiver furthers a substantial, legitimate state interest. Here again
the answer is the same as in the plea bargaining context. Bench trials
14S Id. As for the possibility of increased punishment, the Court said there was no
danger of "vindictive" sentencing inherent in a two-tier system. Id. at 627. As for the
claim of additional delay, the Court found no proof that the two-tier system caused
added delay. Id. at 629.
144 427 U.S. at 634 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1'45 See, e.g., M. LEVIN, supra note 6, at 84; Heumann & Loftin, supra note 6, at
418-20. Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 90-91.
146 The Detroit study found some use of explicit sentencing concessions. Heumann
& Loftin, supra note 6, at 417.
The possibility of a "discount" was raised in Schulhofer, supra note 14, at
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are less expensive than jury trials.14 The Court has recognized the
state interest in efficient disposition of criminal cases14 and has even
recognized that the maintenance of the criminal justice system would be
jeopardized if defendants exercised their constitutional rights fully.
1 50
Thus, at the second stage of the analysis, it appears clear that jury
waiver would advance a legitimate, substantial state interest in the effi-
cient operation of the criminal justice system.
Under the least restrictive alternative analysis, jury waiver can
constitutionally be used as a replacement for plea bargaining only if
jury waiver attains substantially the same state interest and is less re-
strictive of defendants' constitutional rights than plea bargaining.'M A
jury waiver system clearly passes this test, inasmuch as it requires de-
fendants to waive fewer procedural rights than a plea bargaining sys-
tem. Jury waiver defendants retain the right to refrain from self-in-
crimination,15 2 the right to present witnesses153 and confront opposing
witnesses,1 N and the right to the exclusion of evidence procured by un-
constitutional means-for example, coerced confessions,1 5 5 uncounseled
post-indictment interrogation 5 6 and line-ups, 1 57 identification proce-
dures so suggestive as to violate due process,158 and illegal searches and
seizures. 159 Thus, as one commentator has observed, to hold that plea
bargaining is constitutional while jury waiver is not is to adhere to the
ironic proposition that one may not bargain away one's right to a jury
unless one simultaneously bargains away all of one's other trial rights,
as occurs in Court-approved plea bargaining schemes.160
Are the rights retained meaningful in a bench trial? For the most
objective answer to that question, consider a worst-case scenario: a jury
waiver system in which bench trials are perfunctory, nonadversarial af-
14S See infra note 187 and text accompanying notes 177-87.
149 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) ("leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases"); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
752 (1970) ("scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved").
150 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 742, 752 & n.10 (1970) (over three-
fourths of American criminal convictions rest on guilty pleas); see also Burger, supra
note 114, at 931 ("The consequence of . . . a small percentage change in the rate of
guilty pleas can be tremendous.").
15' To date, no commentator has proposed a feasible, less restrictive alternative to
both jury waiver and plea bargaining.
152 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
153 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
154 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
156 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
17 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
'58 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
",' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
160 Schulhofer, supra note 6.
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fairs. (Many observers of jury waiver systems in fact claim that such
bench trials are the norm and have characterized them as "slow
pleas."""1 ) Even in that situation, however, the prosecution would lose
its weakest cases. The most recent study of a jury waiver system, in
Philadelphia in 1982, found a significantly higher than average acquit-
tal rate (thirty-three percent as compared to twenty percent) in cases in
which no defense at all was raised. 6 2 In a plea bargaining system, by
comparison, the prosecution's weakest cases are prime cases for "bluff-
ing."1 6 Knowing he has no case, the prosecutor may bring enormous
pressure to bear on the defendant by offering him a nearly irresistible
"bargain." Thus, even the worst-case scenario for a jury waiver system
is more favorable to defendants than a plea bargaining system. Further-
more, "slow pleas," are not inevitable. The recent Philadelphia study
found that the trials are usually adversarial and defendants are usually
well-represented. 64
Jury waiver is thus less restrictive of constitutional rights than
plea bargaining. Not only does the criminal defendant retain more of
the procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but also those
procedural rights may in some cases result in fairer substantive results
than a plea bargaining system can produce." 5
A jury waiver system does seem to impinge upon the exercise of
constitutional rights by providing a criminal defendant with incentives
to waive his right to a jury trial. This system serves the state interest in
the efficient disposition of criminal cases, an interest which the Court
has recognized as legitimate and substantial. At present, this state goal
is achieved in most jurisdictions by plea bargaining, a system which has
a more restrictive effect upon the exercise of constitutional rights than
would a jury waiver system. Thus, the key constitutional issue becomes
1l See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 250 ("functional equivalent
to the guilty plea"); M. LEvIN, supra note 6, at 80; Heumann & Loftin, supra note 6,
at 420; Mather, supra note 6, at 190; White, supra note 6, at 441-42. The last four
commentators characterize bench trials as "slow pleas."
165 Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 141.
... Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50,
65 (1968). Prime cases for bluffing include those in which a vital witness is dead,
missing, or unwilling to testify. Id.
24 Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 103-05.
185 One could argue that plea bargaining is more flexible and can produce results
better suited to individual circumstances. These sorts of advantages, however, can also
be secured by a jury waiver system. Jury waiver, like plea bargaining, can be imple-
mented in a variety of ways. Of course, even if jury waiver were inflexible, the fact
would not necessarily militate against its use. Flexibility has been derided as "an ad-
vantage all lawless systems exhibit in comparison with systems of administering justice
by rules. The utility of discretion must be balanced against the utility of pre-ordained
rules . . . ." Alschuler, supra note 163, at 71.
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the question whether jury waiver is an alternative to plea bargaining:
does it serve the same state interest with sufficient efficiency to re-
present an alternative? If so, jury waiver would constitute a less restric-
tive alternative and plea bargaining, as a more restrictive practice,
would be unconstitutional.
IV. THE JURY WAIVER ALTERNATIVE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
This Comment has argued that the Court's decisions on plea bar-
gaining and unconstitutional conditions are best understood in terms of
a less restrictive alternative analysis. The argument will now be made
that jury waiver is a less restrictive alternative to plea bargaining and,
therefore, that the Court should declare plea bargaining unconstitu-
tional. At the outset, it may seem perverse to explain or justify the
Court's decisions upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining in a
way that makes plea bargaining unconstitutional. Indeed, such an in-
terpretation would be perverse if the Court had considered and rejected
bench trials as an alternative means of attaining the government's legit-
imate efficiency goals. The Court, however, has not considered bench
trials. On the contrary, the Court in, for example, Santobello v. New
York declared plea bargaining "an essential component of the adminis-
tration of justice" because "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to
a full-scale trial," the resources of the criminal justice system would
have to be "multipl[ied] by many times."16 That opinion confirmed
assertions made by the Chief Justice in a speech several months earlier
to the American Bar Association. He said that a decline in the guilty
plea rate from ninety percent to eighty percent would double the need
for jurors, as well as other court resources, and a decline to seventy
percent would treble that need.167 Clearly, the Court never even consid-
ered bench trials as a possible alternative.
Demonstrating that the Court has been wrong in upholding the
constitutionality of plea bargaining requires more than a showing that
the Court has not considered the possibility that bench trials are an
alternative to guilty pleas as a means of achieving governmental effi-
ciency goals. It requires a showing that bench trials are a true "alterna-
tive." How close do bench trials come to achieving the efficiency levels
reached by plea bargaining systems? Those who have researched bench
trials in jury waiver systems and measured the length of bench trials
166 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (emphasis added).
167 Burger, supra note 114, at 931.
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have been in rough agreement. 168 A Pittsburgh study concluded that
guilty plea dispositions generally required one to fifteen minutes, bench
trials usually consumed ten to thirty minutes, and jury trials took two
to four days.16 A study of Baltim6re was less precise. A hypothetical
bench trial synthesizing the researchers' observations consisted of a rel-
atively complicated armed robbery case in which a motion to quash was
made with arguments from both sides, five witnesses including the de-
fendant testified, the judge "frequently" posed questions to the wit-
nesses, and brief closing arguments were made. 70 The trial was said to
consume fifty minutes. 71 Although that must have been a more serious
case, with more testimony, than the average trial, the author claimed
that a "normal bench trial" required one to two hours, while jury trials
lasted "at least one full day."'7 2 According to one source cited in a
recent study of Detroit, where bench trials were used extensively only
for cases involving firearms, guilty pleas took fifteen minutes, bench
trials thirty minutes, and expeditious jury trials one day.'17  The large
time savings in a bench trial were attributed to time saved by no jury
selection, no opening arguments, brief examination of witnesses, and
"no tricks . . . because there's no jury."1 74 The most recent study, in
Philadelphia, roughly confirmed the previous findings. Based on data
from 340 dispositions,7' that study found that guilty pleas consumed
twenty minutes and bench trials forty-five minutes.'
7
6
In sum, guilty pleas seemed to require about fifteen to twenty
minutes and bench trials about thirty to forty-five minutes, usually
about double the time of a guilty plea. The author of the Philadelphia
study pointed out that this comparison is not completely accurate.
77
Unlike the other studies, the Philadelphia study also measured the de-
l"8 See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 72 (elaborate hypothetical
bench trial said to be possible in 50 minutes); id. at 250 (jury trials typically take at
least one day, and normal bench trials take one to two hours); M. LEVIN, supra note 6,
at 321 n.1 (average guilty plea takes one to fifteen minutes, "a brief informal trial"
takes between ten minutes and two hours, a full-length nonjury trial takes one to two
days, and a full-length jury trial takes two to four days); Heumann & Loftin, supra
note 6, at 417 (average jury trial takes one to two days, average guilty plea takes fifteen
minutes, average bench trial takes one-half hour); Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript
at 159 (average guilty plea takes about twenty minutes, average bench trial takes forty-
five minutes).
189 M. LEVIN, supra note 6, at 321 n.1.
170 J. EIsENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 68-72.
'17 Id. at 72.
172 Id. at 250.
17' Heumann & Loftin, supra note 6, at 417.
174 Id.
175 Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 53.
178 Id. manuscript at 159.
177 Id. manuscript at 58, 157-59.
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lay time involved in either type of disposition.178 That time, measured
at thirty-five minutes for either type of disposition, consisted of such
delays as waiting for a defendant to be brought to the courtroom, wait-
ing for an attorney to arrive at the courtroom, and handling the admin-
istrative details involved in the disposition of criminal cases." 9 After
adding the delay time to the actual disposition time, the Philadelphia
study found that guilty pleas required fifty-five minutes and bench tri-
als took about eighty minutes.1 0 Undoubtedly, the other courts, which
spent roughly the same amount of time as Philadelphia on actual dispo-
sitions, experienced similar delays. Using the Philadelphia results as a
model, it now appears that bench trials consumed forty-five percent
more time than guilty pleas.
That data implies vastly different results from those which the
Court has reached. Although the Court said that the abolition of plea
bargaining would require a multiplication of resources by many
times, 8 ' and the Chief Justice said more specifically that a reduction in
guilty pleas from ninety percent to seventy percent 82 would require a
tripling of resources,1 8 the same reduction would require only a nine
percent increase in resources if bench trials were used as the replace-
ment for guilty pleas.1 8 4 Clearly, the results of the abolition of plea
bargaining need not be the catastrophe that the Court has envisioned.
Although the disparity between the Court's prognostications and
the nine percent figure is great, even the nine percent figure overesti-
mates the necessary increase. It does not consider the large fixed cost
incurred in either type of disposition before the case even comes to
178 Id. manuscript at 59-61.
179 Id. manuscript at 59-60.
180 Id. manuscript at 60, 102.
181 Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
182 See supra text accompanying note 114 (quoting Chief Justice Burger's speech
to the American Bar Association). One should, however, note that if plea bargaining
were abolished, the guilty plea rate would probably fall below seventy percent but not
to zero. Of the 549 cases included in the Baltimore study, forty-five percent of those not
dismissed were disposed of by guilty plea (percentage calculated from figures in J.
EisFNSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 233) despite the fact that researchers found
little evidence of plea bargaining, J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 77.
Similarly, the Philadelphia study found that in 1981, forty-five percent of all disposi-
tions on the merits were achieved by guilty pleas, Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript
at 62, despite the rarity of meaningful plea bargaining. Id. manuscript at 67-72.
'ss Burger, supra note 114, at 931.
184 See Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 159. Even if the guilty plea rate
were to fall by forty percentage points, as note 182 suggests might happen if plea
bargaining were abolished, only an eighteen percent increase in resources would be
needed. This second estimate is still strikingly smaller than the Court's figure of 200
percent.
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court for final disposition."8 5 There may be preliminary hearings, ear-
lier appearances before the court when the case was postponed,
presentence investigations, deferred sentencing hearings, plus a mini-
mum amount of preparation time for the attorneys.18 6 This fixed time,
which would be difficult to measure, should be added to each form of
disposition in order to determine how significant the marginal cost of
providing a bench trial (fifteen to twenty-five minutes depending on the
study used) actually is. The larger the fixed cost is, the lower the per-
centage increase necessary to provide bench trials where before there
were guilty pleas. Thus, if the pre-disposition fixed costs adumbrated
here were added to the fixed delay costs, the increase in resources nec-
essary to reduce the guilty plea rate from ninety percent to seventy per-
cent, becomes even less than the nine percent figure calculated above.1
8 7
Where the Court saw a financial mountain of resistance to the
abolition of plea bargaining, there was perhaps more than a molehill
but certainly not the unscalable peaks it envisioned. An "alternative" to
the present system that would require a multiplication of resources by
many times may fairly be said not to be an alternative at all. But an
alternative that would require a percentage increase of resources in the
tens instead of hundreds of percentage points deserves the Court's
thoughtful consideration. Such a consideration should lead the Court to
view bench trials as a feasible "alternative" 88 to plea bargaining. With
an alternative in existence, plea bargaining is no longer a necessary
evil: it becomes both an unnecessary and an unconstitutional evil.
V. CONCLUSION
A least restrictive alternative framework is a principled framework
in which to rationalize the Court's decisions on the constitutionality of
185 Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at 59-61, 159-159a.
186 Id.
187 Although the Court has failed to consider the efficiency of bench trials, the
Court's calculations regarding the large increase in resources that would be necessary to
provide jury trials have been borne out by the empirical studies. See supra text accom-
panying notes 169 & 172-73. If eight hours were necessary for an average jury trial,
jury trials would cost about thirty-two times more than guilty pleas that average fifteen
minutes each. Even if the time for guilty pleas were set at one hour after factoring in
delay time, jury trials would still cost eight times what guilty pleas cost.
1I Besides the analysis supra, text accompanying notes 168-87, the Court could
properly conclude that jury waiver is an "alternative" to plea bargaining based on the
bare fact that little or no plea bargaining was found in Baltimore, J. EISENSTEIN & H.
JACOB, supra note 6, at 77, or in Philadelphia, Schulhofer, supra note 6, manuscript at
65-72. If these cities, which face crime problems and budget constraints as serious as
those troubling other American cities, could manage without plea bargaining, the Court
could reasonably infer that other cities could do without plea bargaining as well.
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governmental incentives to waive constitutional rights. Applying that
framework to a jury waiver system, one concludes that such a system is
constitutional.
A jury waiver system may properly be seen as a true alternative to
a plea bargaining system by substantially attaining the state's efficiency
goals. Since a jury waiver system is also less restrictive of constitutional
rights than plea bargaining, the analysis mandates that plea bargaining
be declared unconstitutional.

